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Abstract 
In this paper, a unique post-earthquake survey designed to provide a rapid 
assessment of food insecurity in Haiti is used in order to address the question of 
whether cash and food-for-work (C/FfW) programs are allocated adequately in 
Haiti. We consider that the allocation principle should meet two main criteria. 
First, C/FfW programs should be targeted towards people who are in the most 
necessitous circumstances (i.e., poor and food insecure people). Second, these 
programs should be targeted at the most vulnerable people on the labor market. 
Modelling the impact of various covariates on C/FfW programs participation, 
we find that these programs are not specifically targeted at people who are most 
in need, be it because of their low level of subsistence or because of earthquake-
related losses. Pre-earthquake participation to programs appears to be an 
important determinant of post-earthquake participation. What is more, cash-for-
work is very rarely declared as the main source of household income. So, a 
more efficient targeting of these programs should focus on reaching the poorest 
and most vulnerable households in the directly affected areas. Crowding out 
effect of temporary jobs should also be assessed on the labor market. 
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1. Introduction 
The strongest earthquake to occur in Haiti in more than 200 years, with a magnitude of 7.0 on 
the Richter Scale, struck western Haiti on January 12th, 2010, with an epicentre located at 17 
kilometers south-west of Port-au-Prince. Due to its location, the human toll was extremely 
severe: around 2.8 million people were affected by the earthquake, causing between 150,000 and 
220,000 deaths or more depending on the estimate, and even more injuries.2  Over 97,000 houses 
were destroyed and over 188,000 were damaged. 661,000 people moved to non-directly affected 
regions. It inflicted tremendous infrastructural damage to the water and electricity systems, roads 
and ports in the capital, Port-au-Prince, and the surrounding areas. In the early days and weeks 
after the earthquake, a large number of camps were set up by the homeless population in the 
disaster-stricken areas. From a high of 1.5 million people living in 1,555 makeshift camps and 
settlements in July 2010, 810,000 were still staying in 1,150 of these sites in January 2011. 
Emergency assistance programs have rapidly been set up. In addition to food assistance 
programs, cash and food-for-work (C/FfW) programs have provided immediate cash or food 
support to the unemployed after the disaster. Until November 2010, about 240,000 people were 
employed through C/FfW schemes (OCHA, 2011). The work consists in removing and disposing 
of debris and rubble,3 and cleaning drainage to avoid floods. The United Nation World Food 
Program (WFP) reached about 400,000 direct or indirect beneficiaries through C/FfW programs. 
This paper aims to assess the targeting performance of cash and food-for-work programs as well 
as their coverage, cost and efficiency. To do so, we use a unique post-earthquake survey 
conducted in June 2010 and designed for a rapid assessment of food insecurity in Haiti.4 These 
data enable us to present how cash-for-work programs are being run, in particular with respect to 
the skills of participants and their economic situation.  
As reported in the economic literature, public sector jobs can be created within a short time 
frame in order to respond to unemployment situations. However, such programs may induce a 
crowding out effect on private sector jobs. Indeed, in case labor supply should be insensitive to 
                                                 
2
 Main sources: United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); also, based on a 
random survey in Port-au-Prince, Kolbe et al. (2010) estimated that 158,679 people in Port-au-Prince died during the 
quake or in the six-week period afterwards owing to injuries or illness. 
3
 Note that, of the 10 to 11 million cubic meters of rubble, about 10 to 15% only were managed. 
4
 Cf. CNSA (2010a, 2010b). 
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wages, the wage rise induced by the increase in labor demand can cancel out the impact of the 
creation of public sector jobs (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). 
Concerning cash transfer programs in general, several studies and reports from charity 
organizations have evaluated the economic impact of relief for such disasters. For instance, it 
was found that a relatively small-scale program of cash injection into the local grains markets of 
Ethiopia had no impact on prices (Save the children UK, 2001; Mattinen et Ogden, 2006). There 
is however little evaluation of the effects of large-scale cash injections. Research has also shown 
that cash injections did not affect the competitiveness of local markets in Somalia (Narbeth, 
2004), and that the market quickly adjusted to the new cash influx. Finally, Davies (2006) 
mentions that since cash injections are usually made in US dollars, they can result in a dual 
economy and weaken the government's control over their monetary policy, causing a biased 
exchange rate and affecting exportations.  
Some studies have also shown evidence on the specific effect of cash-for-work (CfW) 
interventions. Although this is based on anecdotal evidence only, there is indication that CfW 
programs resulted in slightly higher labor wages in post-tsunami Aceh in 2004 (Doocy et al., 
2006). Also, local food markets were monitored by Oxfam which did not report any systematic 
inflation. Other studies have also found no major price increases due to CfW programs (Adams, 
Meehan and Satriana, 2005; IFRC, 2003).  Mascie-Taylor et al. (2010) found that a CfW 
program in Bangladesh resulted in an improvement in nutrition measures for women and 
children, and in higher amounts of money spent for food than for the non-receiving households. 
The impact of food-for-work programs has also been studied. Maxwell et al. (1994) found that 
these programs did not create a drop in the labor supply, nor did they reduce agricultural 
production in Ethiopia in 1989. However, Barret et al. (2002) found that labor and land 
productivity did decrease with household participation to FfW programs in Ethiopia.   
In this paper, we propose to estimate the effects of various covariates on C/FfW programs 
participation in order to assess the targeting efficiency of such programs after the Haiti 
earthquake. Data allow us to differentiate cash-for-work program participants from food-for-work 
program ones. Indeed, as pointed out by Zaidi et al. (2010), giving cash instead of food may be 
problematic as cash beneficiaries may not be interested in food aid; so, they may be less 
vulnerable than food beneficiaries. 
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Our results show that these programs are not specifically targeted at people who need it the most, 
because of their low level of subsistence or losses due to the earthquake. However, due to data 
limitation it is not possible to assess whether better paid public jobs have replaced lower paid 
private jobs on the labor market. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two presents the main interventions on the labor 
market, their cost and their coverage as well as a description of the beneficiaries. Section three 
provides survey data description and methodological issues. Empirical results are presented in 
section four. In the last section, we discuss the results and suggest avenues for further analysis of 
the labor market. 
2. Description of the Main Interventions 
Before the earthquake, the labor market in Haiti was already a major issue. According to CNSA 
(2008), in rural Haiti, half of the population was inactive (with a higher concentration in the 
North) and the dependency rate (i.e. the number of inactive persons over active ones) appears to 
be particularly high with about 103 inactive persons for 100 employed persons.  
In response to these very restrictive conditions on the labor market, and in addition to food 
assistance programs, cash-for-work (CfW) programs provide immediate cash support to the 
unemployed. In general, CfW are short-term interventions (normally 2-3 months) which provide 
temporary employment in public projects (such as repairing roads, cleansing irrigation channels 
or re-building infrastructure) to the most vulnerable segments of the population or in areas 
affected by natural disasters. After the earthquake, CNSA (2010a) reported that many people 
interviewed in focus groups expressed a preference for activities where their skills and 
capabilities could be used, such as the cash and food-for-work (C/FfW) programs which allow 
people living in affected areas to keep their dignity and self-esteem.  
(a) C/FfW programs before the earthquake 
Among the main actors identified in Haiti before the earthquake,5 the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the Ministry of Interior stood as the most important ones as they handle a big share of the 
PetroCaribe fund for this type of intervention, respectively $6.7 and $2.9 million of USD (see 
Table 1a). Before the earthquake, the MARNDR had spent $1.6 million ($3 million including 
materials) on projects for protection of river banks and clearings out of rivers, creating 91,000 
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 Cf. Borgarello, Echevin and Lamanna (2009). 
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person days of employment, $2.4 million ($4.7 million including materials) for irrigation 
infrastructure rehabilitation, creating around 655,000 person days of work and $2.7 million ($5.1 
million including materials) for gullies correction, creating 951,420 person days of work, with a 
total of 42,000 temporary employees (MARNDR, 2009).  
Apart from the PetroCaribe initiative, the Government implemented other cash-for-work 
programs. The Ministry of Transport (MTPTP) had a well-organized Fund for Road 
Maintenance which constantly used high labor-intensive work programs according to a rotating 
system. The MTPTP determined the area of the intervention, and the city mayor organizes a 
public bid. The road was then divided into 5km plots and each local organization/association 
(recognized as a legal entity by the MTPPT) made an offer. At the end of the bidding process, 
one was selected for each plot but that winner had the option to work and share the plot with 
other organizations. The organization employed the people, paid them, while the MTPTP 
supervised the work. The salary was defined by the organization and was close to the minimum 
wage. In 2008, it was on average $2.5 USD (per 5 hour work day), and it increased in 2009 to $5 
USD for an 8 hour work day.  
One advantage of cash and food-for-work programs is that they can be self-targeting, for 
example when the staple foods or wages offered are inferior to what richer households will work 
for. So, the success of such programs is determined by the level of wages. According to a 
MercyCorps paper (2009), a good practice is to set the wage 10-20% below the market rate in 
order to attract less advantaged people. Nevertheless, in the immediate aftermath of a large-scale 
disaster it may be appropriate to adopt a higher wage scale in order to compensate for the abrupt 
interruption of regular employment activities. The cash injected by a cash-for-work project also 
should be calibrated to minimize market distortions such as price fluctuations, worker 
dependency or competition with local producers. Where situations include food shortage or 
when barter is predominant in society, it might be better to consider food-for-work programs 
instead of cash. 
Before the earthquake, the World Food Program was implementing a food-for-work program (2 
years – $9.1 million USD). The unemployed people, and also often the single heads of 
households as well as vulnerable and food insecure people were selected to participate in labor-
intensive food-for-work activities. Beneficiaries were selected in both urban and rural 
communities. Food-for-work (FfW) activities with an agricultural orientation were implemented 
in the Northern and North-Eastern departments in order to create agricultural assets and to 
prevent further environmental degradation through water management interventions. Other types 
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of FfW interventions targeted urban and peri-urban areas around Port au Prince, Gonaives and 
Cap-Haitian, such as community-based labor-intensive activities to prevent civil unrest and other 
smaller scale activities in other parts of the country.  
The FfW activities were implemented on the basis of worked days. Communities had agreed to 
rotate work teams. FfW participants received a family ration of five goods consisting of grains, 
pulses, vegetable oil and iodized salt. Taking into account the seasonal and geographical 
variation in the costs of the principal foodstuffs, the per worker cost of the ration is equivalent to 
approximately $2.25 USD.  
After conducting a pilot project in 2007 that focused on peri-urban areas, the WFP is now 
working jointly with UNDP (and ILO for technical assistance). Workers received half of their 
income in cash and half in kind (UNDP pays $1.14 USD per day per worker). The implementing 
agencies were always NGOs or local associations which had signed an agreement with the 
MARNDR. This joint modality solved a situation of shortage in food production (that can be 
caused by large food distributions) and increased the possibility for workers to feed their 
families and avoid market problems of illiquidity (lack of cash market). After the pilot phase, the 
UNDP, WFP and ILO were implementing a $50 million USD program over 24 months, where 
10-15% will be used for CfW.  
Among the other donors who did not operate through UN agencies, the main ones were USAID 
and EU: they spent almost $15 million USD in CfW, following similar program rules, mainly 
working through NGOs (such as CHF International OIM, World Vision, CRS for USAID; and 
AVSI GRET Caritas OIM, Oxfam, Action aid, Concert action, Action contre la faim for EU). 
France, the WB (PRODEP) and the IDB with MTPTC/DTP also used this social safety net 
modality. 
Program beneficiaries were spread all over the country, but with a higher concentration around 
main cities (Port au Prince, Gonaives, Cap Haitien) and in specific rural areas. For the most part, 
beneficiaries were  unemployed, adults between 18-45 years, with a percentage of female 
workers between 30% and 40% depending on the project. As a general rule, residency in the area 
of intervention was the only conditionality. People were eligible for a maximum of 25-40 days 
of employment on a rotating basis. Otherwise, wage level was the basis for the self-styled 
selection process of elegibility. 
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The project cost per employee highly varied across projects. Many variables cannot always be 
extrapolated from the total spending on salaries -such as the number of days worked, the 
spending on materials and administrative overhead. However, on average, the estimated cost per 
employee ranged between $150 USD and $300 USD  (e.g. the WFP program had a cost of $123 
USD to which we should add the UNDP cost of $57 USD). 
Table 1a. Main interventions in cash/food-for-work programs before the earthquake 
 Million of USD Temporary employees 
Average USD day wage  
for unskilled 
MARNDR (PetroCaribe) 6.725 42,000 2.8-3.7 
MIC/BMPAD (PetroCaribe) 2.925 10,636* (unskilled) 3.8–5.0 (skilled) 6.3–10 
USAID 8.221 106,744 2.8 
MTPTC 2.750 6,360 (5 hours) 2.5 
EU 6.500 41,000* NA 
WFP 3.811 30,900** (5 hours) 2.25 
UNDP (& ILO) 1.528 27,026** 3.38 (1.14cash + 2.24kind) 
OTHER (France, WB, IDB) 1.170 7,297 3-3.75 
Source: Borgarello, Echevin, Lamanna (2009). 
Note: * Estimation from the average wage. ** Some beneficiaries receive half of the wage in kind (food) and half in 
cash, which means they are the same employees. 
(b) C/FfW programs after the earthquake 
Cash or food-for-work programs data are hard to come by after the earthquake in Haiti. The 
previous main sources for those programs were the different Haiti Ministries who 
understandably have not provided any new information since the earthquake. According to the 
United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affaires (OCHA), between February 
and November 2010, 240,000 people have beneficiated from C/FfW programs through 231 
projects (OCHA, 2011). Based on published information by main international organizations, 
Table 1b reports that USAID has invested about 7 million USD for about 60,000 employees 
across four different programs, while the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has 
spent about 34 million USD for almost 100,000 jobs.6 It is also found that the United Nations 
World Food Program (WFP) has funded about 55,000 jobs, while the Mercy Corps has done the 
same for about 29,000 jobs.  
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 The UNDP’s CfW program has planned to employ several hundred thousands people over the course of 2010. The 
work consists in removing and disposing of debris and rubble, and cleaning drainage to avoid floods. 
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Table 1b. Main interventions in cash/food-for-work programs after the earthquake 
 Million of USD Temporary employees 
Average USD day wage  
for unskilled 
USAID 7.27 60,505 N/A 
WFP N/A 55,000 N/A 
UNDP (& ILO) 33.89 95,700 5 
OTHER (France, WB IDB) N/A 29,000 N/A 
Sources: 
1. http://kosovo.info.usaid.gov/oig/public/fy10rpts/1-521-10-009-p.pdf 
2. http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/wfp226995.pdf 
3. http://www.undp.org/french/haiti/Haiti_updates.pdf 
4. http://www.mercycorps.org/haiti/whatweredoing 
(c) Description of beneficiaries of C/FfW programs 
Using data from a post-earthquake food security-oriented survey conducted in June 2010 (see 
section 3 for data description), we have tried to describe the beneficiaries of post-earthquake 
C/FfW programs. Since data are available only at the household level, we consider that when at 
least one household member takes part in cash or food-for-work programs, all the people living in 
the household beneficiate directly or indirectly from these programs.  
Table 2a reports results from our estimates. The estimated population is calculated from the last 
census corrected with some updates. According to the EFSA II survey, the active population in 
June 2010 made up for about 53% of the total population in the directly affected areas, that is 
95% of the working age population.7 This active population represents about 1,474,000 
individuals (including all household members in households benefiting from these programs). 
These figures are lower in the non-directly affected areas: 265,000 people are active in these 
areas, which represents 45% of the total population and 91% of the working age population. After 
the earthquake, the population in the non-directly affected areas appears to be less food insecure 
(21% have poor or limit food consumption) than those living in the directly affected areas (27%). 
Tables 2b and 2c compute statistics on cash-for-work and food-for-work beneficiaries 
respectively. In June 2010, in the directly affected areas, there are around 146,000 estimated 
beneficiaries of cash and food-for-work programs (compared to 37,000 before the earthquake); 
among them 34% have a poor or limit food consumption (compared to 42% before the 
earthquake). In the non-directly affected areas, about 22,000 people are direct or indirect 
beneficiaries of these programs after the earthquake (compared to 18,000 before the earthquake); 
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 Note that because of the nature of the questionnaire, calculations on the active population are limited to those aged 
18 and over, whereas the standard is 14 and over. 
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among them, 35% have a poor or limit food consumption (compared to 43% before the 
earthquake).  
Interestingly enough, whereas the number of direct or indirect beneficiaries of these programs has 
increased after the earthquake (from a total of about 55,000 people before the earthquake to 
168,000 people in June 2010), the percentage of food insecure people among beneficiaries has 
decreased (from about 42% before the earthquake to 34% in June 2010 in both directly and non-
directly affected areas). These figures thus suggest that the targeting of new beneficiaries after the 
earthquake has been less effective than the targeting of beneficiaries before the earthquake. 
(d) Targeting performance of C/FfW programs 
Beside the issue of allocating C/FfW programs to the poorest and most vulnerable households, 
these programs also present some critical issues. First, the risk of competition with the 
agricultural sector should be stressed. Indeed, the better season for road maintenance and 
infrastructure rehabilitation coincides with seasonal agricultural period. This basically means that 
not all the temporary workers in CfW program would necessarily be unemployed. This effect is 
of course much smaller in the urban earthquake-affected areas where the projects are currently 
concentrated. With regard to program implementation, there is apparently little control or 
supervision, especially among donors. The MTPTP also recorded cases of subcontracting 
workers. 
Furthermore, the use of C/FfW can create a risk of dependency. This has been the case for the 
Solid Waste Clean-up activities. This program exemplifies that the use of CfW programs can 
generate two types of dependency. At the institutional level, CfW programs can become a way 
of solving budget constraints. Before the earthquake, the DAS within MTPTP started using CfW 
programs according to available funds instead of developing a sustainable strategy. At the same 
time, at the community level, the presence of CfW programs induced local people to stop any 
voluntary waste removal jobs in their neighborhoods. The risk of long-term market distortion is 
however lower in the current earthquake relief situation, since most of the programs are used for 
rubble clearing, which is an activity that is mostly needed only now, and should not have an 
impact on the long-term labor market in the country. 
3. Data 
(a) Data sources and methodology 
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A post-earthquake food security-oriented survey was conducted in June 2010 by the CNSA in 
collaboration with its main partners (ACF, FEWS-Net, Oxfam GB, FAO, UNICEF and WFP). 
The sampling used for the household survey is a probabilistic cluster method, using two stages: 
(i) enumeration sections (geographical areas) and camps and (ii) households. 2003 census data is 
used to select the enumeration sections, with a probability proportional to population size. Eight 
households are then selected randomly in each section. Camps are selected using the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) data; the number of camps selected was 
proportional to the size of the communes. The sampling method yielded 1901 interviewed 
households, located in the disaster areas (camp and non-camp sites) as well as in some non-
directly affected areas. Geographic strata covered by the EFSA II survey are presented in Figure 
1. 
To randomly select households, different methods were used for the urban households, the rural 
households and the camps. For urban households, survey investigators observe and mark the 
location of households on a street map that does not contain socio-economic infrastructure, and 
the households are randomly selected. For rural households, previously mapped buildings are 
randomly selected using enumeration section maps, and households living in those buildings are 
interviewed; if there are no households inside, then the closest household is selected. For camps, 
survey investigators start from the centre of the camp and walk towards the outside in a different 
randomly selected path. They number each household encountered in the way, and randomly 
select two households to interview. For all three types of sampling, when multiple households 
are found living in the same building or tent, a single household is randomly selected.   
In the June 2010 survey, rough estimates were made of the total post-earthquake populations 
using the 2009 projected populations estimates from the Institut Haïtien de Statistique et 
d’Informatique (IHSI), estimated deaths due to the earthquake, and out-migration as estimated 
by Bengtsson et al. (2010). This allowed for improved population weights in analysis, although 
this could not correct for the potential bias introduced by the obsolete sampling frame of 
enumeration sections.    
These population weights were used to more accurately estimate population percentages and 
numbers for programmatic use. However, in this paper the probability weights were not used in 
analysis. This decision was made to simplify analysis and to maximize the household data 
available (rather than weighting and under- or over-counting certain households, and thus 
possibly underutilizing certain data when observing relationships between variables or 
exaggerating measurement error when over-counting some household data). Additionally, the 
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low confidence in the population estimates, even if an improvement over no estimates for 
programmatic purposes, do not warrant use in this study.   
This paper does not claim that the findings are representative of the population; however the 
relationships between the findings are believed to still be correctly indicative. All statistically 
significant findings were run both with and without the probability weights to ensure that the 
weights (or lack of weights) do not change the overall findings.  
(b) Asset index before and after the earthquake 
Based on the June survey, an asset index is calculated using a set of pre-earthquake dichotomous 
variables, namely durable goods and access to basic utilities. Results from multiple 
correspondence analysis (see, e.g., Asselin, 2009) are presented in Table 1.8 Weights have signs 
consistent with interpretation of the first component as an asset-poverty index. In directly 
affected areas, contribution to inertia of lighting appears to be particularly high (26.7%). Water 
source also contributes in a large extent to inertia (18.9%). Having tools or material for fishery, 
agricultural production and handicraft contributes to 12.2% of the inertia explained by the first 
component of the analysis.9 Other items contribute to less than 10% of inertia each.  
In non-directly affected areas, determinants of asset-poverty are very similar: contribution of 
lighting and water source represents 48.5% of first component inertia. Having a television, a fan 
or tools and material contribute respectively to 11.5%, 9.3% and 9.0%. 
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 Note that all our results have been replicated using a more restrictive definition of the asset index for which water 
source, water filtration, lighting, type of toilet and tools/material were not included in the multiple correspondence 
analysis. Regression results (presented later) in particular did not differ greatly when using this alternative asset 
index. Also, results do not vary much when using factor analysis instead of multiple correspondence analysis to build 
the index. 
9
 Table 1 shows that households with tools/material (for fishery, agricultural production and handicraft) will be 
classified as poorer households (asset index weight equals -0.951). This is due to the fact that such asset variable is 
not well correlated with other asset indicators (e.g., private water, electricity for lighting, WC, oven, television, fan 
and so forth) that would classify them as richer. In this sense, the asset index can be described as the best regressed 
latent variable on the assets variables (or primary indicators) since no other explained variable is more informative 
(Asselin, 2009). 
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Figure 3. Asset-wealth distribution  
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Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) surveys. Notes: The sample is restricted to the households 
residing in the six strata that cover areas directly affected by the earthquake. Asset index weights are calculated 
using pre-earthquake assets. 
Using retrospective data on assets from the June survey, Figure 3 presents the asset index 
distributions before the earthquake, in February and in June. Using this index, it is to be noticed 
that the inequality in household wealth (as measured by the Gini coefficient) has decreased after 
the earthquake due to bigger losses among the wealthiest. This is particularly true among 
households living in camps (Gini is 0.2446 before the earthquake and 0.1970 in February). Then, 
between February and June, inequality in household wealth has increased—from 0.3267 to 
0.3325 among non-camp households and from 0.1970 to 0.2183 among camp households. 
Figure 4. Asset-wealth losses distribution  
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Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) surveys. Notes: The sample is restricted to the households 
residing in the six strata that cover areas directly affected by the earthquake. Asset index weights are calculated 
using pre-earthquake assets.  
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Figure 4 presents the distribution of asset-wealth losses in percentage of pre-earthquake asset-
wealth. The percentage of asset loss among households who lost assets is around 25%. This 
percentage does not seem to vary a lot according to asset-wealth quintile.  
(c) Food insecurity after the earthquake 
The food consumption score is calculated based on the number of different food groups 
consumed by the household, to represent diversity, and on how many days they are consumed in 
the past week. This score is then converted into three groups using standard cut-offs (poor, 
borderline, and acceptable food consumption), and these groups are often used as a proxy for 
food security status of households. In February, 31% of the households living in directly affected 
areas were experiencing borderline or severe food insecurity (22% and 9% respectively, 
borderline or poor food consumption), that is nearly double the food insecurity prevalence 
observed before the earthquake. According to the EFSA surveys conducted in February and in 
June, in the directly affected areas, food insecurity (as measured by the food consumption score) 
had dropped from 31% in February to 27% in June (cf. CNSA, 2010a, 2010b). 
4. Empirical Results 
Tables 5a and 5b present descriptive statistics by pre-earthquake asset-wealth. First, Tables 
present variables describing household vulnerability such as employment status, death of 
workers, housing damage and asset losses after the earthquake. Second, variables such as the 
household’s main income source, participation in cash and food-for-work programs as well as 
the benefice derived from remittances from relatives or friends are presented before and after the 
earthquake. Benefits from various assistance programs are presented in June.  
(a) Losses 
These figures reveal that, in directly affected areas, the richest households lost more than the 
poorest ones: although in June only 4.5% of the richest households had no workers (6.8% among 
the poorest), 11.5% of them experienced the death/missing of workers due to the earthquake 
(5.6% among the poorest) and 86.5% lost assets in February (17.6% among the poorest). An 
equal proportion of the richest and the poorest had had their housing partially or totally 
destroyed due to the earthquake (32.4%). Finally, because they were mostly urban, the richest 
households had not registered agricultural assets losses, whereas the poorest had (for 7.2% of 
them).  
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Interestingly enough, in June 2010, many of the richest households had recovered from the pre-
earthquake situation (16.0% of them), whereas the poorest households were more numerous to 
have lost assets in comparison with pre-earthquake conditions (19.6% in June compared to 
17.6% in February). 
(b) Main income sources 
Table 5a also shows that main income sources have been hit by the disaster: although the 
percentage of households for whom agriculture production is the main source of income has kept 
stable over the period, incomes from trade, unskilled and skilled works have dropped. 
Conversely, income from transfers and other income sources have logically become more 
prominent: in February, 22.8% of households declared these sources of income as their main 
one, whereas they were only 6.9% to do so before the earthquake. This percentage fell to 13.8% 
in June. 
Furthermore, clear differences appear between the richest and the poorest: the structure of 
income sources is relatively stable among the poorest before and after the earthquake, whereas it 
was sharply modified among the richest due to the earthquake. This can be explained by the fact 
that income sources are less diversified among the poorest and only few of them benefit from 
money remittances. What is more, poorer households relied more commonly on informal 
activities that resumed more quickly than formal activities, and activities such as agriculture 
were little impacted by the quake, but teachers, shop owners, etc. were not as able to quickly 
return to that kind of work. 
(c) Remittances 
When considering remittances received from relatives or friends, we observe that, in June, 9.2% 
of the poorest households in directly affected areas received remittances from Haiti, while they 
were 22.1% among the richest. Remittances from Haiti decreased over the period: from 14.1% 
before the quake among the poorest (resp. 14.5% received transfers from abroad) to 10.4% in 
February (resp. 10.4%) and 9.2% in June (resp. 8.4%). Among the richest, remittances from 
Haiti decreased from 29.1% to 23.4% in February and 22.1% in June, and remittances from 
abroad decreased from 34.4% before the quake, to 28.7% in February and 21.7% in June. 
(d) Participation in cash and food-for-work programs 
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Participation in cash-for-work (CfW) concerned 1.2% of households before the earthquake 
(0.8% among the poorest and 0.4% among the richest), 4.3% in February (4.4% among the 
poorest and 4.1% among the richest) and 6.0% in June (5.6% among the poorest and 5.3% 
among the richest). Interestingly, CfW does not represent a primary source of income for 
households: only 0.9% of households declare it as their main source of income in June (0.4% 
among the poorest and 0.8% among the richest). 
Unlike what was observed for CfW programs, the percentage of households benefiting from 
food-for-work programs did not change drastically over the period (around 1% of the households 
benefited from FfW programs). Furthermore, in the same way as CfW programs, FfW programs 
did not appear to be particularly targeted at the poorest. 
When comparing participation in programs in non-directly affected areas, the targeting 
performance of C/FfW programs appears to be more efficient: indeed, the poorest benefited 
more from C/FfW programs than did the richest households. Nevertheless, the participation in 
such programs fell slightly over the period. 
Hence, although disaster-related shocks (e.g., death of workers, loss of income sources, loss of 
remittances, etc.) have affected all quintiles, the poorest households should also be considered as 
the most vulnerable ones in the face of these changes (because of low diversification of income 
sources, less workers in the household, more agricultural and fewer skilled jobs, etc.). However, 
programs did not seem to benefit more the poorest households. 
From these facts, it is possible to conclude that C/FfW programs after the earthquake are not 
well-targeted. These programs do not seem to benefit in priority the poorest households. The 
efficiency of these programs is, however, difficult to fully assess from these figures. Indeed, on 
the one hand, losses were often more sizeable among the wealthiest, so assistance programs may 
have also made up for them. On the other hand, C/FfW programs should have benefited the most 
unskilled people in order not to distort the good working order of the labor market. For instance, 
better paid public jobs may have replaced low paid private jobs in agriculture or elsewhere. 
Available data, however, do not enable us to assess this possibility.  
(e) Multivariate analysis 
Regressions are estimated separately for cash-for-work, food-for-work and both considered 
jointly. Table 7a first provides estimates for CfW and FfW programs participation without other 
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covariates than pre-earthquake assets, asset losses and pre-earthquake participation to programs. 
Second, Table 7b presents estimates when adding other covariates such as pre-earthquake 
agricultural assets, agricultural asset losses, the number of workers dead or missing (in directly 
affected areas), hosting displaced people (in non-directly affected areas), post-disaster housing 
damage (in directly affected areas), location, social associations membership and participation to 
other assistance programs. Third, Table 7c provides estimates of the effects of other household 
characteristics such as marital status, gender, age and education of the head of the household, the 
fact of living in a private housing or not, the number of infants, children, youths, adults and 
elderly people in the household, the number of workers, the fact of having agricultural practice 
or not, and post-earthquake variables such as the main source of income and the fact of having 
savings or banking accounts. (See Table 6 for descriptive statistics on these variables). 
As a result, estimates appear not to be concerned with mutlicolinearity problems: indeed, 
estimates of the effects of pre-earthquake assets, asset losses and pre-earthquake participation to 
programs are not very different when adding or not other covariates in the regressions. Pre-
earthquake asset index and the asset losses appear to have no significant effects on participation 
in either CfW or FfW programs. What is more, pre-earthquake participation to programmes 
appears to be an important determinant of post-earthquake participation. Thus, this enforces our 
doubt concerning the efficiency of targeting of C/FfW programs, particularly in areas where 
people were severely hit by the earthquake. 
On the other hand, regressions presented in Table 7b, with more covariates included, show that 
participating to a cooperative as well as other social association membership have positive and 
significant effects on CfW participation in directly affected areas, whereas Tontine/Sol/Sabotay 
membership increases CfW participation in non-directly affected areas. Concerning FfW 
programs, other social association membership has a positive effect in directly affected areas, 
whereas Union membership and agricultural association membership have positive effects in 
non-directly affected areas. These results are evidence of the existence of social networks that 
may favour the participation to programs. However, as indicated in Table 8, social association 
membership appears to be rather equally distributed according to households’ asset-wealth. So 
the social network effect may not foster an efficient targeting of C/FfW programs. 
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Table 8. Social association membership 
Asset-wealth quintile  In % Poorest 2 3 4 Richest All 
Directly affected areas       
Religious association 20.7 30.5 21.6 38.3 27.6 26.3 
Non religious association 11.9 9.0 12.3 9.4 12.1 11.2 
All 29.6 35.6 29.3 42.3 34.3 33.1 
Non-directly affected areas      
Religious association 8.9 9.6 13.8 13.6 9.2 11.0 
Non religious association 17.7 30.8 37.3 16.1 8.4 21.9 
All 24.5 37.4 42.9 22.3 16.0 28.5 
Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) survey. 
One step further, we consider supports allocated by social associations to their members in Table 
9. In directly affected areas, it appears that 33.8% of the poorest benefit from support (21.8% in 
religious association and 55.2% in non religious association) against only 11.7% among the 
richest (9.7% in religious association and 11.1% in non religious association). As a matter of 
fact, social associations mostly contribute to support the neediest people to face bad conjuncture 
(according to the June 2010 survey, 43.2% of households receive support from social 
associations at this occasion in directly affected areas, 33.3% in non-directly affected areas). 
Table 9. Supports to social association members 
Asset-wealth quintile  In % Poorest 2 3 4 Richest All 
Directly affected areas       
Religious association 21.8 14.1 5.6 11.3 9.7 12.1 
Non religious association 55.2 15.8 36.8 14.3 11.1 29.9 
All 33.8 15.7 17.7 13.6 11.7 18.6 
Non-directly affected areas      
Religious association 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 20.0 4.7 
Non religious association 26.9 31.0 37.2 16.7 30.0 29.9 
All 19.4 23.7 32.7 16.0 26.3 18.6 
Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) survey. 
Lastly, in Table 7b, an Assistance variable has been included in order to test the existence of 
substitution or complementarity effects between C/FfW programs and other assistance programs. 
Benefiting from other social assistance programs may indeed decrease or increase the probability 
to benefit from C/FfW program. For instance, a positive effect can indicate that more informed 
(or more ‘connected’) people may get better access to assistance programs and cumulate them. 
Our estimates show a positive effect of the Assistance variable on CfW participation in directly 
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affected areas, and a negative effect in non directly affected, but these effects have low statistical 
significance (at 10 percent level).  
Table 7c presents regressions with all covariates included. Estimates show that agricultural asset 
losses have a negative and significant impact on CfW participation (but not on FfW 
participation). This may be an indication that the most agrarian households participated less in 
CfW programs.  Being married and living in a female-headed household significantly decrease 
CfW participation. Living in private housing and having savings before the earthquake both have 
positive and significant effects on CfW participation. In non-directly affected areas, none of 
these variables are significant. In these areas, participation in Tontine/Sol/Sabotay and the 
presence of breast-feeding women in the household significantly increase CfW participation.  
Also, in Table 7c, determinants of FfW appear to be different from CfW ones. In directly 
affected areas: other social associations, the number of adults between 18-60 and having a bank 
account have positive and significant effects on FfW participation. The number of workers 
significantly decrease FfW participation. In non-directly affected areas: the number of children 
displaced and hosted in the household, Union or agricultural association membership 
significantly increase FfW participation. 
5. Discussion 
Despite its questionable representativeness, the survey used in this paper provides a unique 
source of information in order to study cash and food-for-work programs participation after the 
Haiti earthquake. Although it is not possible with this data to assess the crowding out effects of 
C/FfW programs on the labor market, the targeting performance of these programs is carefully 
assessed. It is shown that C/FfW programs after the earthquake are not well-targeted to benefit in 
priority the poorest households. What is more, these programs do not beneficiate in priority 
those households that have lost more because of the earthquake. Instead, pre-disaster 
participation to C/FfW programs and other determinants such as agricultural asset losses, marital 
status, housing, savings and social association membership have significant impact on post-
disaster participation to C/FfW programs. Such empirical evidences can be considered as 
contradictory to an efficient targeting that would give priority for social assistance—in particular 
C/FfW programs—to most vulnerable households. 
These findings thus suggest that there is scope for C/FfW programs to better target poor and 
vulnerable people in Haiti. For that purpose, government and development agencies should take 
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stock of the situation in Haiti which is changing rapidly. In particular, after a peak in mid-2010, 
the population in camps has decreased drastically. Many people have been displaced from one 
area to another. People moved to escape the disaster area and then they came back home. 
Furthermore, in the wake of the 2010 earthquake, Hurricane Tomas, the cholera epidemic, the 
rising prices of basic foodstuffs, and the socio-political uncertainty following the election results 
of November 28, 2010, are, among others, some major factors likely to further deteriorate living 
conditions in Haiti. So, in the perspective to better target assistance programs and safety nets 
responding to major shocks, households’ livelihoods and vulnerability on the labor market 
should be reassessed based on new data. 
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Figure 1. Geographic strata covered by the EFSA II survey 
 
Source: CNSA (2010b). 
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Table 2a. Descriptive statistics on the labor market 
  
Poor/Limit 
Food 
Consumption 
 
Adults (18 
years and 
over) 
 Active Population1 
 
Estimated 
Population 
 % Number of people  % 
Number 
of people  
% of 
adults 
% of 
population 
Number 
of people 
            
Strata 1 (Port-au-Prince, Delmas, Carrefour)  1316000  25 327563  60 791899  92 55 729834 
Strata 2 (Gressier, Leogane) 211000  26 54348  58 121861  96 55 116971 
Strata 3 (Petit Goave, Jacmel) 326000  31 101895  54 175538  98 53 171412 
Strata 4 (Petionville, Tabarre)  389000  18 71514  57 220636  92 52 203960 
Strata 5 (Cite Soleil)  212000  29 61181  54 115248  94 51 107779 
Strata 6 (Grand Goave, Croix-des-Bouquets)  351000  35 121537  50 174042  98 49 170801 
            
Total, affected areas 2804000  27 759503  55 1555802  95 53 1474353 
 
           
Strata A (Jean Rabel, Bombardopolis,  
Baie de Herne, Mole St. Nicolas, Anse Rouge, Terre Neuve) 291000  21 60734  50 145063  98 49 142005 
Strata B (Belle Anse)  69000  30 20803  43 29626  92 39 27175 
Strata C (Gonaives Ville)  229000  14 31480  54 123871  85 46 105861 
            
Total, non- affected areas 589000  21 123799  49 290609  91 45 264859 
Source: CNSA (2010b) and own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) survey. Note: (1) active population is calculated over only the adult 
population (18 years and over). 
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Table 2b. Cash-for-work beneficiaries 
 Before Earthquake June 
 Beneficiaries2 
Poor/Limit Food 
Consumption 
Amongst 
Beneficiaries3 
Beneficiaries2 
Poor/Limit Food 
Consumption 
Amongst 
Beneficiaries3 
 % Number 
of people % 
Number 
of people % 
Number 
of people % 
Number 
of people 
         
Strata 1 (Port-au-Prince, Delmas, Carrefour)  1 19539 65 12643 9 116084 50 58617 
Strata 2 (Gressier, Leogane) 1 2633 0 0 7 13916 24 3385 
Strata 3 (Petit Goave, Jacmel) 3 9523 60 5714 7 23490 26 6031 
Strata 4 (Petionville, Tabarre)  0 0 0 0 2 8338 31 2566 
Strata 5 (Cite Soleil)  1 1779 30 534 4 7826 20 1601 
Strata 6 (Grand Goave, Croix-des-Bouquets)  2 6158 32 1945 3 11019 44 4861 
         
Total, affected areas 1 37210 42 15711 5 145947 34 49614 
 
        
Strata A (Jean Rabel, Bombardopolis,  
Baie de Herne, Mole St. Nicolas, Anse Rouge, Terre Neuve) 2 5462 42 2276 5 13327 0 0 
Strata B (Belle Anse)  8 5500 55 3008 7 4956 55 2710 
Strata C (Gonaives Ville)  0 0 0 0 0 1025 0 0 
         
Total, non-affected areas 3 17827 43 7586 4 22496 35 7953 
Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) survey. Notes: (2) all members of a household receiving cash/food-for-work are considered 
as beneficiaries; (3) percentage calculated over the number of beneficiaries.
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Table 2c. Food-for-work beneficiaries 
 Before Earthquake June 
 Beneficiaries2 
Poor/Limit Food 
Consumption 
Amongst 
Beneficiaries3 
Beneficiaries2 
Poor/Limit Food 
Consumption 
Amongst 
Beneficiaries3 
 % Number 
of people % 
Number 
of people % 
Number 
of people % 
Number 
of people 
         
Strata 1 (Port-au-Prince, Delmas, Carrefour)  1 16091 21 3448 1 12643 0 0 
Strata 2 (Gressier, Leogane) 0 376 100 376 1 1128 100 1128 
Strata 3 (Petit Goave, Jacmel) 2 5079 44 2222 4 13649 16 2222 
Strata 4 (Petionville, Tabarre)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Strata 5 (Cite Soleil)  1 1245 0 0 1 2134 42 889 
Strata 6 (Grand Goave, Croix-des-Bouquets)  0 972 100 972 1 2593 100 2593 
         
Total, affected areas 1 17365 36 6202 1 33076 33 10750 
 
        
Strata A (Jean Rabel, Bombardopolis,  
Baie de Herne, Mole St. Nicolas, Anse Rouge, Terre Neuve) 2 4588 21 978 1 2622 0 0 
Strata B (Belle Anse)  5 3485 82 2873 5 3485 78 2726 
Strata C (Gonaives Ville)  1 2050 0 0 1 2636 0 0 
         
Total, non-affected areas 2 14007 55 7752 2 13300 63 8339 
Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) survey. Notes: (2) all members of a household receiving cash/food-for-work are considered 
as beneficiaries; (3) percentage calculated over the number of beneficiaries. 
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Table 4. Asset index weights 
  Directly affected areas Non-directly affected areas 
Variable Weight Inertia (%) Weight Inertia (%) 
Water Source     
 Tap water -0.494 0.055 -0.802 0.075 
 Private water 0.845 0.121 1.093 0.092 
 Well water -0.511 0.013 0.615 0.021 
Water Filtration     
 Filtration product* -0.354 0.025 -0.294 0.009 
 Rudimentary method 0.102 0.000 -0.057 0.000 
Cooking Fuel -0.232 0.026 -0.234 0.021 
Lighting     
 Electricity 0.405 0.049 1.094 0.131 
 Lamp -1.273 0.218 -0.803 0.166 
Toilet     
 Latrine -0.134 0.007 0.221 0.010 
 WC 1.467 0.095 1.391 0.017 
Oven 1.369 0.086 1.066 0.006 
Heater 0.003 0.000 0.196 0.009 
Hot water tank -0.133 0.009 -0.235 0.020 
Television 0.402 0.050 1.112 0.115 
Radio 0.102 0.004 0.411 0.029 
Cell phone 0.018 0.000 0.113 0.003 
Bicycle 0.215 0.003 0.933 0.039 
Motorcycle 0.373 0.004 1.040 0.026 
Flatiron 0.155 0.008 0.172 0.006 
Fan 0.597 0.069 1.359 0.093 
Car 1.092 0.029 0.758 0.007 
Sewing machine 0.308 0.004 0.555 0.012 
Tools/Material -0.951 0.122 -0.588 0.090 
Small business stocks 0.089 0.001 0.068 0.001 
      
Partial inertia contribution (%) 14.78  19.16  
Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) survey. Weights are estimated according to the pre-
earthquake situation of households. Note: *Filtration products are generally used in relatively poor regions so that it 
can explain the negative weight. 
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Table 5a. Employment status, main income sources, cash/food-for-work and other transfers, by pre-earthquake quintile of 
asset-wealth (directly affected areas) 
 Before the earthquake  After the earthquake (February 2010)  
After the earthquake 
(June 2010) 
In % 1 2 3 4 5 All  1 2 3 4 5 All  1 2 3 4 5 All 
Affected areas                     
Number of households 250 259 239 254 244 1246  250 259 239 254 244 1246  250 259 239 254 244 1246 
No workers - - - - - -  - - - - - -  6.8 6.2 8.8 7.9 4.5 6.8 
Workers dead/missing - - - - - -  - - - - - -  5.6 8.1 9.6 8.7 11.5 8.7 
Housing partially/totally destroyed - - - - - -  - - - - - -  32.4 45.9 38.9 35.0 32.4 37.0 
Asset losses - - - - - -  17.6 38.2 51.9 79.5 86.5 54.6  19.6 39.0 57.3 74.0 70.5 51.9 
Agricultural losses - - - - - -  - - - - - -  7.2 6.2 2.9 0.4 0.0 3.4 
Main income source                     
  Without sources of income 1.2 0.8 1.3 0.8 0.0 0.8  0.8 0.8 1.7 2.8 2.9 1.8  0.4 0.0 0.8 0.4 1.2 0.6 
  Agricultural production 37.6 15.4 4.2 1.6 0.4 12.0  38.0 15.1 5.0 1.6 0.4 12.1  38.8 15.1 5.0 2.0 0.4 12.4 
  Trade 29.6 32.4 39.7 42.5 42.2 37.2  26.4 24.3 31.4 35.4 30.3 29.5  28.0 27.8 31.4 36.2 35.7 31.8 
  Unskilled work 20.0 32.8 29.7 28.3 16.8 25.6  19.2 29.0 22.2 21.7 12.3 20.9  20.4 32.8 30.5 28.0 15.6 25.5 
  Skilled work 8.0 15.8 16.7 16.9 30.3 17.5  6.4 10.0 10.0 12.2 23.4 12.4  6.0 11.6 13.4 16.1 29.1 15.2 
  Cash-for-work 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.4 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5  0.4 0.8 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 
  Remittances 2.0 1.2 3.8 3.9 5.3 3.2  4.4 8.9 13.4 12.2 16.0 10.9  4.0 6.2 8.4 9.1 9.8 7.5 
  Other income sources 1.6 1.5 4.6 5.9 4.9 3.7  4.4 11.2 15.9 13.8 14.3 11.9  2.0 5.8 8.8 7.5 7.4 6.3 
Cash/food-for-work 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.0 0.8 1.7  4.8 4.2 4.2 5.9 4.1 4.7  6.0 6.9 4.2 8.7 5.3 6.3 
  Cash-for-work 0.8 1.5 1.7 1.6 0.4 1.2  4.4 3.9 3.8 5.5 4.1 4.3  5.6 6.2 4.2 8.3 5.3 6.0 
  Food-for-work 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.7  0.8 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.9  0.4 1.5 1.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 
Remittances received from relatives/friends               
  from Haiti 14.1 17.0 25.3 25.6 29.1 22.1  10.4 13.9 24.9 23.6 23.4 19.1  9.2 11.6 22.8 22.4 22.1 17.5 
  from abroad 14.5 11.6 15.6 21.3 34.4 19.4  10.4 9.7 12.7 18.5 28.7 15.9  8.4 7.7 8.9 13.0 21.7 11.9 
Assistance                     
  Food - - - - - -  - - - - - -  23.3 33.2 37.9 33.9 33.6 32.3 
  Non food (material) - - - - - -  - - - - - -  14.8 10.0 10.0 12.6 10.2 11.6 
  Healthcare - - - - - -  - - - - - -  10.0 14.3 12.1 20.1 18.9 15.1 
  Agricultural - - - - - -  - - - - - -  10.6 2.4 2.2 0.8 0.4 3.3 
Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) survey. 
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Table 5b. Employment status, main income sources, cash/food-for-work and other transfers, by pre-earthquake quintile of 
asset-wealth (non-directly affected areas) 
 Before the earthquake  After the earthquake (February 2010)  
After the earthquake 
(June 2010) 
In % 1 2 3 4 5 All  1 2 3 4 5 All  1 2 3 4 5 All 
Non-affected areas                     
Number of households 151 109 130 130 130 650  151 109 130 130 130 650  151 109 130 130 130 650 
No workers - - - - - -  - - - - - -   10.6 5.5 3.1 3.8 6.2 6.0 
Hosting displaced people - - - - - -  - - - - - -  24.5 26.6 36.2 60.8 63.8 42.3 
Main income source                     
  Without sources of income 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.5 0.5  0.0 0.9 1.5 1.5 6.2 2.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Agricultural production 54.3 59.6 52.3 21.5 5.4 38.5  55.0 57.8 52.3 20.0 4.6 37.8  54.3 56.9 54.6 22.3 5.4 38.6 
  Trade 23.8 19.3 22.3 25.4 42.3 26.8  22.5 17.4 23.1 26.2 34.6 24.9  24.5 19.3 21.5 24.6 34.6 25.1 
  Unskilled work 18.5 15.6 13.8 30.8 20.8 20.0  17.2 15.6 13.1 30.0 20.8 19.4  17.2 15.6 13.1 31.5 22.3 20.0 
  Skilled work 2.6 2.8 6.2 10.0 12.3 6.8  2.6 2.8 5.4 10.0 13.8 6.9  2.0 2.8 5.4 10.8 16.2 7.4 
  Cash-for-work 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.2 
  Remittances 0.7 0.9 1.5 5.4 13.1 4.3  1.3 2.8 1.5 6.2 13.1 4.9  0.7 2.8 2.3 6.2 14.6 5.2 
  Other income sources 0.0 1.8 3.1 6.9 4.6 3.2  1.3 2.8 3.1 6.2 6.9 4.0  1.3 2.8 3.1 4.6 6.2 3.5 
Cash/food-for-work 13.2 11.0 3.8 1.5 2.3 6.5  11.3 7.3 2.3 0.8 2.3 4.9  11.3 8.3 2.3 0.8 0.8 4.8 
  Cash-for-work 6.0 3.7 0.0 0.8 1.5 2.5  4.0 3.7 0.0 0.8 1.5 2.0  6.0 3.7 0.0 0.8 0.8 2.3 
  Food-for-work 8.6 10.1 3.8 0.8 0.8 4.8  9.3 6.4 2.3 0.0 0.8 3.8  7.9 7.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 3.5 
Remittances received from relatives/friends               
  from Haiti 23.2 37.6 40.0 26.9 19.2 28.9  23.8 30.3 16.9 13.1 20.8 20.8  23.2 27.5 16.9 13.1 16.9 19.4 
  from abroad 2.0 4.6 9.2 13.1 26.9 11.1  0.7 3.7 6.9 7.7 25.4 8.8  0.7 3.7 6.2 9.2 21.5 8.2 
Assistance                     
  Food - - - - - -  - - - - - -  12.0 12.8 13.1 5.4 0.8 8.8 
  Non food (material) - - - - - -  - - - - - -  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.5 
  Healthcare - - - - - -  - - - - - -  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 0.6 
  Agricultural - - - - - -  - - - - - -  1.4 4.7 5.6 3.7 0.0 3.0 
Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) survey. 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics  
  Affected areas   Non-affected areas 
  Mean Std   Mean  Std 
Cash-for-work before the quake  0.01 0.11  0.02 0.15 
Food-for-work before the quake  0.01 0.09  0.04 0.20 
Pre-earthquake assets  35.57 18.84  25.15 21.81 
Asset losses in February  4.18 11.37  1.05 5.31 
Pre-earthquake agricultural assets  8.19 17.13  - - 
Agricultural asset losses  -0.05 3.16  - - 
Number of workers  
dead/missing  0.11 0.41  - - 
Hosting displaced people  - -  0.42 0.49 
Number  of children hosted  - -  0.38 0.89 
Number of adults hosted  - -  0.94 1.64 
Number of elderly people hosted  - -  0.02 0.17 
Some hosted people still remain  - -  0.08 0.26 
All hosted people still remain  - -  0.15 0.36 
Housing damaged but  
still usable  0.45 0.50  - - 
Housing partially or totally destroyed  0.37 0.48  - - 
Sleeping beside the house  0.09 0.28  - - 
Sleeping in the neighborhood  0.27 0.44  - - 
Sleeping in the commune  0.18 0.39  - - 
Sleeping outside the commune  0.02 0.14  - - 
Sleeping in a camp  0.45 0.50  - - 
Religious association  0.25 0.44  0.11 0.31 
Sports/ Cultural association  0.02 0.15  0.02 0.14 
Union  0.00 0.03  0.01 0.08 
Cooperative  0.00 0.05  0.00 0.07 
Tontine / Sol / Sabotay  0.04 0.19  0.01 0.12 
Womenfolk's association  0.02 0.13  0.03 0.16 
Consumer association  0.00 0.05  0.01 0.11 
Konbit, eskwad, other  
agricultural association  0.02 0.14  0.12 0.33 
School committee  0.01 0.08  0.00 0.07 
Other social association  0.01 0.10  0.01 0.12 
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Married  0.26 0.44  0.47 0.50 
Female head  0.51 0.50  0.53 0.50 
Age of head  41.84 13.52  44.71 14.57 
Primary education  0.40 0.49  0.27 0.44 
Secondary education  0.07 0.25  0.07 0.26 
Tertiary education  0.03 0.16  0.02 0.14 
Living in private housing  0.45 0.50  0.77 0.42 
Number of infants 0-5  0.69 0.87  0.98 1.08 
Number of children 6-11  0.79 1.10  1.18 1.17 
Number of youths 12-17  0.78 1.11  0.98 1.14 
Number of adults 18-60  3.19 1.91  3.35 2.12 
Number of elderly over 60  0.18 0.43  0.27 0.56 
Number of sick persons  0.32 0.54  0.25 0.49 
Number of pregnant women  0.09 0.30  0.09 0.29 
Number of lactating women  0.18 0.40  0.20 0.41 
Number of disabled people  0.03 0.18  0.06 0.24 
Number of workers  3.02 2.01  3.05 2.34 
Agricultural practice  0.24 0.43  0.67 0.47 
Agricultural production  0.12 0.32  0.39 0.49 
Trade  0.37 0.48  0.27 0.45 
Unskilled work  0.26 0.44  0.20 0.40 
Skilled work  0.18 0.38  0.07 0.25 
Remittances  0.03 0.18  0.04 0.20 
Other income source  0.04 0.19  0.03 0.17 
Savings  0.36 0.48  0.26 0.44 
Bank account  0.35 0.48  0.18 0.39 
Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) survey. 
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Table 7a. Cash and food-for-work determinants 
   
Cash-for-work  Food-for-work  Cash or food-for-work 
    
Directly 
affected areas  
Non-directly  
affected areas  
Directly 
affected areas  
Non-directly  
affected areas  
Directly 
affected areas  
Non-directly  
affected areas 
    
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value 
Cash-for-work before the quake   0.453 0.000  0.711 0.000  0.067 0.004  0.217 0.000  0.380 0.000  0.567 0.000 
Food-for-work before the quake   0.128 0.111  0.048 0.027  0.640 0.000  0.527 0.000  0.485 0.000  0.450 0.000 
Pre-earthquake assets  -0.001 0.233  0.000 0.245  0.000 0.961  -0.001 0.149  -0.001 0.184  -0.001 0.070 
Asset losses in February  0.002 0.104  0.001 0.460  0.000 0.611  0.001 0.398  0.001 0.182  0.001 0.216 
    
                 
Number of  households   1180  613  1180  613  1180  613 
R2   0.0553   0.5332   0.3083   0.4519   0.0775   0.4581 
Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) survey. 
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Table 7b. Cash and food-for-work determinants (more covariates included) 
   
Cash-for-work  Food-for-work  Cash or food-for-work 
    
Directly 
affected areas  
Non-directly 
affected areas  
Directly 
affected areas  
Non-directly 
affected areas  
Directly 
affected areas  
Non-directly 
affected areas 
    
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value 
Cash-for-work before the quake   0.453 0.000  0.701 0.000  0.068 0.004  0.198 0.000  0.379 0.000  0.547 0.000 
Food-for-work before the quake   0.108 0.180  0.047 0.039  0.644 0.000  0.516 0.000  0.466 0.000  0.436 0.000 
Pre-earthquake assets  0.000 0.704  0.000 0.243  0.000 0.753  0.000 0.203  0.000 0.620  -0.001 0.107 
Asset losses in February  0.001 0.371  0.001 0.431  0.000 0.937  0.001 0.467  0.001 0.559  0.001 0.244 
Pre-earthquake agricultural  
assets  0.000 0.761  - -  0.000 0.693  - -  0.000 0.799  - - 
Agricultural asset losses  -0.004 0.068  - -  0.001 0.444  - -  -0.004 0.094  - - 
Number of workers  
dead/missing   -0.019 0.275  - -  -0.007 0.267  - -  -0.020 0.271  - - 
Hosting displaced people   - -  -0.009 0.567  - -  0.009 0.622  - -  -0.001 0.953 
Number  of children hosted   - -  0.007 0.208  - -  0.015 0.033  - -  0.017 0.042 
Number of adults hosted   - -  0.003 0.384  - -  0.001 0.741  - -  0.002 0.752 
Number of elderly people hosted   - -  -0.005 0.847  - -  -0.001 0.968  - -  -0.010 0.797 
Some hosted people still remain   - -  0.003 0.862  - -  -0.032 0.173  - -  -0.014 0.611 
All hosted people still remain   - -  0.009 0.531  - -  0.004 0.843  - -  0.004 0.860 
Housing damaged but  
still usable 
  
0.021 0.290  - -  -0.004 0.623  - -  0.024 0.245  - - 
Housing partially or totally destroyed   0.020 0.410  - -  0.002 0.796  - -  0.024 0.331  - - 
Sleeping beside the house   0.003 0.897  - -  -0.006 0.557  - -  0.005 0.863  - - 
Sleeping in the neighborhood   0.032 0.362  - -  -0.016 0.228  - -  0.028 0.428  - - 
Sleeping in the commune   0.040 0.281  - -  -0.014 0.315  - -  0.033 0.369  - - 
Sleeping outside the commune   0.004 0.945  - -  -0.018 0.383  - -  -0.003 0.951  - - 
Sleeping in a camp   -0.004 0.891  - -  0.016 0.201  - -  0.002 0.952  - - 
Religious association   -0.017 0.293  -0.015 0.302  0.000 0.938  -0.037 0.044  -0.014 0.403  -0.045 0.037 
Sports/ Cultural association   0.040 0.379  -0.034 0.287  -0.027 0.114  -0.030 0.449  0.027 0.557  -0.039 0.402 
Union   -0.051 0.827  -0.010 0.861  -0.011 0.897  0.148 0.037  -0.051 0.830  0.167 0.045 
Cooperative   0.283 0.040  0.008 0.902  0.022 0.678  0.032 0.678  0.290 0.039  0.030 0.747 
Tontine / Sol / Sabotay   0.031 0.383  0.128 0.001  0.007 0.599  -0.033 0.476  0.023 0.521  0.093 0.087 
Womenfolk's association   -0.043 0.415  -0.018 0.527  -0.003 0.863  0.017 0.612  -0.045 0.397  -0.007 0.854 
Consumer association   -0.044 0.740  0.000 0.995  0.000 0.995  -0.050 0.329  -0.047 0.729  -0.058 0.334 
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Konbit, eskwad, other  
agricultural association   
-0.007 0.896  0.014 0.293  -0.004 0.844  0.058 0.001  -0.008 0.876  0.052 0.008 
School committee   -0.072 0.421  -0.007 0.917  -0.010 0.757  -0.005 0.953  -0.069 0.450  -0.016 0.861 
Other social association   0.130 0.056  0.003 0.935  0.079 0.002  0.009 0.842  0.128 0.064  0.008 0.877 
Assistance  0.027 0.069  -0.024 0.092  0.002 0.735  0.001 0.943  0.028 0.065  -0.014 0.497 
    
                 
Number of  households   1180  613  1180  613  1180  613 
R2   0.0772  0.5452  0.3191  0.4819  0.0984  0.4788 
Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) survey. 
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Table 7c. Cash and food-for-work determinants (all covariates included) 
   
Cash-for-work  Food-for-work  Cash or food-for-work 
    
Directly 
affected areas  
Non-directly  
affected areas  
Directly 
affected areas  
Non-directly  
affected areas  
Directly 
affected areas  
Non-directly  
affected areas 
    
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value  
Marginal 
effect P-value 
Cash-for-work before the quake   0.435 0.000  0.696 0.000  0.055 0.023  0.168 0.000  0.356 0.000  0.518 0.000 
Food-for-work before the quake   0.096 0.239  0.040 0.089  0.644 0.000  0.485 0.000  0.452 0.000  0.398 0.000 
Pre-earthquake assets  0.000 0.620  0.000 0.470  0.000 0.305  -0.001 0.218  0.000 0.492  -0.001 0.227 
Asset losses in February  0.001 0.331  0.001 0.450  2.45e-06 0.995  0.001 0.467  0.001 0.518  0.001 0.304 
Pre-earthquake agricultural  
assets  0.001 0.331  - -  0.000 0.435  - -  0.001 0.295  - - 
Agricultural asset losses  -0.005 0.026  - -  0.001 0.519  - -  -0.005 0.037  - - 
Number of workers  
dead/missing   -0.018 0.338  - -  -0.008 0.268  - -  -0.018 0.342  - - 
Hosting displaced people   - -  -0.008 0.594  - -  0.012 0.537  - -  0.002 0.921 
Number  of children hosted   - -  0.007 0.199  - -  0.015 0.028  - -  0.017 0.042 
Number of adults hosted   - -  0.003 0.406  - -  -0.001 0.773  - -  -0.001 0.895 
Number of elderly people hosted   - -  0.000 0.999  - -  -0.003 0.934  - -  -0.009 0.834 
Some hosted people still remain   - -  0.001 0.975  - -  -0.024 0.306  - -  -0.007 0.793 
All hosted people still remain   - -  0.013 0.431  - -  0.013 0.510  - -  0.013 0.578 
Housing damaged but  
still usable 
  
0.018 0.388  - -  -0.004 0.652  - -  0.020 0.336  - - 
Housing partially or totally destroyed   0.019 0.454  - -  0.006 0.524  - -  0.024 0.358  - - 
Sleeping beside the house   0.024 0.434  - -  -0.007 0.518  - -  0.024 0.443  - - 
Sleeping in the neighborhood   0.053 0.156  - -  -0.018 0.214  - -  0.049 0.200  - - 
Sleeping in the commune   0.069 0.084  - -  -0.017 0.276  - -  0.061 0.135  - - 
Sleeping outside the commune   0.034 0.565  - -  -0.020 0.371  - -  0.025 0.677  - - 
Sleeping in a camp   0.007 0.849  - -  0.018 0.173  - -  0.012 0.729  - - 
Religious association   -0.003 0.854  -0.020 0.197  0.001 0.871  -0.033 0.079  0.000 0.991  -0.046 0.035 
Sports/ Cultural association   0.036 0.441  -0.028 0.404  -0.019 0.289  -0.019 0.649  0.025 0.598  -0.037 0.453 
Union   -0.008 0.972  -0.027 0.657  0.003 0.975  0.156 0.031  -0.008 0.973  0.170 0.047 
Cooperative   0.231 0.105  -0.003 0.959  0.006 0.908  0.053 0.501  0.240 0.096  0.044 0.635 
Tontine / Sol / Sabotay   0.025 0.509  0.113 0.004  0.006 0.649  -0.040 0.395  0.018 0.638  0.078 0.164 
Womenfolk's association   -0.032 0.553  -0.022 0.450  -0.003 0.868  0.023 0.509  -0.034 0.536  -0.007 0.859 
Consumer association   -0.014 0.916  -0.004 0.919  -0.002 0.962  -0.059 0.253  -0.021 0.879  -0.068 0.260 
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Konbit, eskwad, other  
agricultural association   
-0.003 0.961  0.012 0.421  0.007 0.743  0.060 0.001  -0.004 0.937  0.054 0.010 
School committee   -0.081 0.375  -0.009 0.885  0.007 0.850  0.016 0.837  -0.074 0.425  0.008 0.931 
Other social association   0.124 0.075  0.012 0.769  0.082 0.002  0.014 0.769  0.123 0.081  0.013 0.829 
Assistance  -0.041 0.016  0.010 0.304  -0.001 0.928  -0.018 0.108  -0.038 0.028  -0.006 0.643 
Married  -0.035 0.020  -0.001 0.893  0.006 0.316  0.002 0.868  -0.030 0.048  0.006 0.672 
Female head   -0.001 0.323  0.000 0.461  0.000 0.224  0.000 0.829  -0.001 0.292  0.000 0.645 
Age of head   -0.003 0.852  -0.005 0.677  0.000 0.977  -0.026 0.089  0.002 0.888  -0.024 0.190 
Primary education   0.012 0.691  0.011 0.611  -0.004 0.761  -0.004 0.875  0.010 0.757  0.016 0.602 
Secondary education   -0.029 0.575  -0.001 0.978  -0.014 0.477  -0.021 0.634  -0.023 0.659  -0.024 0.649 
Tertiary education   0.051 0.034  -0.005 0.666  0.003 0.726  0.019 0.159  0.049 0.042  -0.009 0.575 
Living in private housing   -0.001 0.941  0.004 0.362  0.002 0.583  -0.005 0.351  0.000 0.982  0.001 0.937 
Number of infants 0-5   -0.011 0.080  -0.007 0.072  0.002 0.526  0.007 0.136  -0.012 0.059  0.003 0.540 
Number of children 6-11   -0.003 0.687  0.004 0.352  0.003 0.270  -0.001 0.842  -0.002 0.731  0.000 0.957 
Number of youths 12-17   0.005 0.539  -0.001 0.804  0.011 0.002  -0.006 0.125  0.010 0.276  -0.010 0.031 
Number of adults 18-60   0.019 0.339  -0.001 0.912  -0.006 0.407  0.020 0.096  0.025 0.216  0.010 0.467 
Number of elderly over 60   0.011 0.419  -0.016 0.128  -0.004 0.405  -0.019 0.131  0.008 0.534  -0.024 0.102 
Number of sick persons   -0.025 0.295  -0.006 0.712  0.002 0.854  0.008 0.657  -0.024 0.310  0.003 0.894 
Number of pregnant women   -0.022 0.272  0.026 0.029  -0.003 0.690  0.021 0.142  -0.017 0.403  0.036 0.040 
Number of lactating women   0.012 0.762  -0.003 0.887  0.021 0.162  -0.008 0.757  0.012 0.771  -0.005 0.863 
Number of disabled people   -0.007 0.445  -0.002 0.485  -0.010 0.002  0.004 0.248  -0.011 0.221  0.007 0.105 
Number of workers   -0.018 0.569  0.007 0.618  -0.010 0.375  0.026 0.121  -0.023 0.466  0.023 0.246 
Agricultural practice   0.039 0.702  0.009 0.895  0.013 0.737  -0.006 0.947  0.045 0.661  -0.023 0.818 
Agricultural production   0.062 0.527  0.013 0.847  0.009 0.811  0.034 0.685  0.063 0.525  0.011 0.911 
Trade   0.056 0.568  0.015 0.831  0.023 0.529  0.068 0.415  0.067 0.503  0.052 0.599 
Unskilled work   0.022 0.826  0.003 0.970  0.015 0.689  0.039 0.646  0.021 0.833  0.009 0.932 
Skilled work   0.066 0.527  -0.018 0.798  0.007 0.862  0.030 0.733  0.066 0.536  -0.012 0.905 
Remittances   0.043 0.681  0.017 0.817  0.014 0.730  0.034 0.697  0.047 0.656  0.018 0.864 
Other income source   0.039 0.012  -0.016 0.209  0.000 0.939  -0.007 0.661  0.033 0.034  -0.022 0.232 
Savings   -0.001 0.959  0.024 0.146  0.017 0.009  0.025 0.212  0.004 0.805  0.042 0.077 
Bank account   0.024 0.115  -0.022 0.147  0.002 0.787  0.002 0.896  0.025 0.101  -0.010 0.657 
    
                 
Number of  households   1154  609  1154  609  1154  609 
R2   0.1059  0.5631  0.3398  0.5198  0.1252  0.5104 
Source: Own computations using June 2010 (EFSA II) survey. 
